Advocates of negotiations between Israel and Syria often employ Kissingerian logic that this will lead to isolating Iran. This is based on the assumption that Syria is independent to pursue its own foreign policy and has sufficient political power to change its orbit from Iran to the West. Right wing critics mistakenly interpret the interplay between Syria, Hezbollah and Iran as a symptom of the weakness of the Assad regime. This commentary is based on the “Evil Axis” paradigm and by that it ignores the flexibility of secular authoritarian regimes (such as Egypt, Jordan, China) over time. The Syrian political elite, like some of its Arab rivals, is not bound to a rigid religious or ideological stance, therefore it can – and eventually will – change its policies in the regional and international arenas.
The best example in recent years is the dramatic change in Libyan foreign policy: after agreeing to dispose of its nuclear weapons, Libya headed by Gaddafi has changed from an isolated authoritarian regime into an integral part of the international community. The reason is simple: Gaddafi realized he was barking up the wrong tree.
The recent deterioration of bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey exemplifies, in a mirror image, what can occur when regional interests are changing quickly: until a year ago, military cooperation was effective, bilateral economic trade flourished, and Israelis preferred taking their holidays in the southern beaches of Turkey than in Israeli southernmost city of Eilat. Nevertheless, a combination of internal political undertones and the will to exploit the weakening role of Egypt as the regional mediator caused the Turkish government to pursue pro-Iran, pro-Islamic policies rather than pro-US.
Indeed, it comes as no surprise that Syria has no intention of ending its relationship with Iran. Assad wants to engage both worlds: involve the Americans in the negotiations with Israel on the one hand, and leveraging its links with Iran to gain regional power against rival Arab countries and against the US.
However, right wing pessimists misinterpret the Obama doctrine, which prefers diplomatic manoeuvres over the use of force. This is not a reincarnation of the optimistic, almost naive Wilson doctrine; at the same time, it is not led by the ideological pro-democracy fervour of Reagan and Bush. Obama acts, in a way, not unlike the Syrian regime: a balanced blend of pragmatic, almost opportunistic foreign policy based on a few basic assumptions, the most important is the understanding that the Israeli Palestinian conflict is the key to achieving stability in the Middle East.
Needless to say, each of the actors in the Middle East arena has his own objectives which dictate different, sometimes colliding, ways of implementing them. But, it is safe to assume that most actors are led by rational, cold, almost “businesslike” considerations rather than blind faith.
In other words, many threaten to “push the button” but all understand the perils in doing so.