When the Arab Peace Initiative (API) was launched at the Arab League conference in Beirut back in March 2002 the Middle East was a very different place, although similarly beset by strife as it remains today. Momentous events overshadowed the announcement of the Saudi proposed plan and meant that it was unable to get a fair hearing either in Israel or among Israel’s supporters in the West. The Second Intifada was in full swing with regular terrorist outrages obstructing the chances for peaceful dialogue. The fact that Hamas committed the suicide bombing attack which came to be known as the Passover Massacre the day before the publication of the Peace Initiative meant that it never had much chance of getting a fair hearing at that time.
The API has a number of advantages over other plans. The fact it is known as the Arab Peace Initiative, for example, makes it much easier to sell to the domestic populations of the Arab world than anything which can be portrayed as being imposed from the outside, whether it has emanated from the UN, the EU, the US, the Quartet or elsewhere. However, it is not merely for these cosmetic and symbolic reasons that Saudi Arabia has repeatedly pushed the plan. The reason the API was re-endorsed at the Riyadh summit in 2007 and, indeed, has been readopted on several occasions is because it is a good enough plan with enough flexibility built into it that it has a chance of achieving lasting and widespread beneficial results.
Importantly, the Arab authors of the API carefully ensured that the demands of their plan can be reconciled with Israel’s four well known and long established core preconditions for peace: the maintenance of Israel’s territorial integrity and national security, the preservation of Israel’s Jewish national identity, the unity of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and the normalisation of relations with the entire Arab world. The inclusion of these considerations together with the Arab goals of Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967, a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, and the acceptance and establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State, creates a framework for productive negotiation that holds much promise for both sides.
Achieving the normalization of Israeli relations with the Arab nations would have a transformative effect across the Middle East which could bring untold advances in cooperation across tourism, agriculture and industry. Even a cold peace such as has been maintained by Egypt and Israel would bring huge benefits by ending the constant threat of war and conflict that has hung over the region and held back regional development for decades.
Focusing on the API as a framework for a new peace agreement would be consistent with the other negotiations undertaken in the last few years. Separate bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and Syria have been conducted along the basic lines of the API, so there would be no conflict with other recent efforts.
The fact that setbacks in the peace process have not stopped the Arab states from continuing to endorse the API over the past few years is an important and encouraging demonstration of their good faith. Both sides, Arab and Israelis, have intractable elements. There are Jihadists and Takfiris implacably opposed to allowing Israel to exist, just as there are also right wing politicians in Israel committed to expansion rather than compromise. Moderate leaders on both sides need to work tirelessly to expose the fiction that either side can have it all, and to promote the idea that compromise and humility are necessary to overcoming the current violent stalemate. The API is unique among peace plans for its comprehensive and inclusive approach. It provides the best framework we have in which that process of diplomatic compromise can and must take place to build confidence on both sides and achieve durable gains for peace and security.