The current approach of the international community towards Hamas of non-engagement is not sustainable. The EU has the capacity to complement the endeavours of the U.S. while not challenging it as an oppositional counterpart. While the U.S. refuses to negotiate with Hamas, the EU can engage in Track II diplomacy towards Hamas on an array of issues ranging from releasing kidnapped Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit (to achieve good will towards Israel and that will only contribute towards an environment of both sides recognising one another), strengthening civil-society in Gaza through allocating increased finances directly to civil-societal organisations, bettering the human rights conditions in Gaza and weaning Hamas away from Iranian sponsorship. Iran's sponsorship of Hamas makes the conflict more intractable and bringing Hamas into the EU's orbit will further advance a context that is conducive to initially managing and ultimately resolving the conflict.
This Track II initiative towards a sub-state group is an extension of the strategy exhorted by numerous policy officials in Washington DC circles that seek to decouple Syria from Iran and who promote it as being 'realistically' feasible. Similarly, President Obama had welcomed leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to attend his speech at Al Azhar University in Cairo. Recently Al-Quds newspaper claimed that Obama Administration officials were conducting secret talks with Hamas prompting vehement denials from the White House. Despite this, the Obama administration has provided Hamas financial support to the sum of 400 million dollars. It is fair to say that a Track II diplomatic initiative would receive the tacit support of the Obama administration. Yet the current approach by the international community of not speaking with Hamas has not been merely unproductive, but has led to a heightening of the conflict. Not engaging Hamas further pushes it within Iran's orbit, enabling the regime to wield its proxy as it considers fit even to the extent of initiating a war with Israel. As time goes on, Hamas will become an increasingly pivotal actor in the peace process. Recently, the flotilla incident placed a tremendous amount of diplomatic pressure on Israel, and promoted Hamas as a result of Israel's easing of the blockade on Gaza. Hamas has further been strengthened by Turkey's support.
My personal experience is that this is a realistic course of action and there is room for optimism. In a meeting with Aziz Dwaik, Hamas's most senior representative in the West Bank and elected speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Dwaik revealed to me that Hamas would be willing to recognize Israel's right to exist and nullify its charter, which calls for the destruction of Israel. The Jerusalem Post in Jan 1, 2010 further reported that Dwaik also relayed to me that other Hamas leaders, including Damascus-based leader Khaled Mashaal and Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, both expressed their support for establishing an independent Palestinian state within the pre-1967 boundaries. This scenario demonstrated that reaching out to Hamas could be a moderating influence to them causing their position vis a vis the State of Israel to change. Hamas's charter is over two decades old and the Hamas leadership recognises that changing their charter signals their embracing of modernity. It is precisely the EU's usage of soft power in the form of European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and its capacity to engage, that represents to Hamas modernity.
When the international community refuses to engage Hamas and humanitarian agencies bemoan the lack of financial aid for them to develop Gaza, this results in Hamas being emboldened to develop Gaza in its own image. To this end, a black market economy has developed in which tunnels are built to smuggle goods. Ultimately Hamas profits handsomely from this regardless of whether the international community wants to hold talks with it or not. Reengagement naturally reduces radicalism while creating an opening for liberal forces to be fostered and ultimately thrive. To this end, it is paramount for the international community to demand that civil-societal organisations including NGOs and schools are not co-opted by Hamas, enjoy their independence and function in security. This is only part of a strategy that should be embraced as it will advance a viable Palestinian state. While the EU has focused on supplying humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, the EU must invest in building robust liberal and transparent state institutions. Of course this can not be achieved without meeting with Hamas officials.
Finally, the EU can also adopt the productive position of advancing reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah. This will resolve the Israeli dilemma of not having a peace partner to negotiate with and furthermore offer a secure environment for the EU to cultivate the growth of civil-society which began with the Barcelona Process. Such a context will enable Track II diplomacy to advance the position that municipal elections (originally scheduled for July 2010) and national elections (originally scheduled for Jan 2010) to take place and not be delayed repeatedly. It is only in this liberal environment that negotiations can take place between Israel and the Palestinians coupled with achieving a positive outcome.